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01 Introduction
Some companies are better than others at introducing new products or entering new markets. One
kind of advantage is technological– some companies can serve customers at lower cost. Another
kind of advantage is informational– some companies are better at predicting which new products
or markets will be proﬁtable. If this advantage is known, though, it brings with it the peril of
attracting imitation. If Burger King knows that McDonald’s is better at marketing research, it
might follow McDonald’s entry into a new town, free riding on its information. If Airbus knows
that Boeing has an advantage in gauging the strength of demand (or the cost of development) for
a new superjumbo class of jets, Airbus may imitate Boeing’s entry into that market. Entering
ﬁrst, however, can result in preemption, a concern very much in the minds of Airbus and Boeing
when they actually did consider entering that market in the 1990’s (see Esty & Ghemawat (2002)).
A ﬁrm with information that a new market will be proﬁtable must choose its entry time and
announcement date to trade oﬀ the advantage of preemption against the disadvantage of disclosing
its private information.
Whether it is better to move ﬁrst or second is an old question in game theory, the subject of
an extensive literature that we will later discuss. discuss below. The choice of when to move has
most commonly been seen as a question of whether it is better to commit or to outbid– of whether
actions are strategic substitutes or strategic complements.
Uncertainty is another reason to delay. There are two dimensions to uncertainty: when it
is resolved, and whether information is asymmetric. When information is symmetric, there is
a second-mover advantage if the leader’s choice causes uncertainty to be resolved– for example,
through proﬁts observed after entry. If, on the other hand, information is asymmetric, the less-
informed player wants to delay so as to observe the better-informed player’s move and learn from
it. The better- informed player wants to delay to keep his information private. We will look at the
conﬂict between these two motivations.
In our model, whether it is best to move ﬁrst or to move second depends on the quality of
information. If the informed player’s information is inaccurate, there is a ﬁrst mover advantage
for both players, the advantage of being able to foreclose a market. Both players know that the
informed player’s information is weak, so their main concern is to avoid competing in the same
market.Choosing the same market does not necessarily put them both in the big market. Instead,
they might both end up in the small market, the worst possible outcome.
On the other hand, if the informed player’s information is relatively accurate, the second-
mover advantage dominates. Both players know that the informed player has a good chance of
picking the big market, and this outweighs the disadvantage of competing in the same market. The
uninformed player wants to imitate, and the informed player wants to evade imitation. There are
both oﬀensive and defensive reasons to delay.
If duopoly competition is not severe, the greater precision of information can lead to ineﬃ-
ciency. More precise information increases the informed player’s incentive to conceal through delay.
1Industry proﬁts fall because this prevents both players from being in the market most likely to be
large.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 considers the case
in which timing of entry is exogenous, and Section 5 considers the case where timing is endogenous.
Section 6 is a modiﬁcation of the model which adds a cost of delayed entry to the model. Also it
shows what happens when we reverse our assumption that a player prefers to be a duopolist in the
big market to a monopolist in the small one. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
An informed player (I) and an uninformed player (U) each will enter either the North (N) or
the South (S) market, one of which is bigger than the other. In the ﬁrst period they choose
simultaneously to enter North, enter South, or wait. If one player waits and the other does not, the
waiting player can observe the entering player’s ﬁrst-period choice before choosing his own market
in the second period. The second mover cannot observe proﬁts, however, which are received only at
the end of the game. Player i’s action set can thus be represented as A = {ai,ti}, where i ∈ {U,I}
denotes the player, ai ∈ L = {N,S} denotes the market entered, and t = {t1,t2} denotes the period
of entry.
Table 1 shows the ex-post payoﬀs, with x < αy for 0 < α < 1. A monopolist earns x > 0 or
y > x depending on whether its market is small or large. Each of two duopolists would earn α as
much as a monopolist.
Uninformed player
Big Market Small Market
Big Market αy,αy y,x
Informed player
Small Market x,y αx,αx
Table 1: Ex-Post Payoﬀs for Big and Small Markets
(for y > x > 0 and 0 < α < 1)
If being in a duopoly instead of a monopoly hurts a player’s proﬁts, as it does unless the
two players’ products are complements, then 0 < α < 1. If a duopoly industry earns less than
a monopoly, as in the Cournot model with identical products, then 0 < α < 0.5. If consumers
suﬃciently value diﬀerentiated products, then α > 0.5 and the industry earns more as a duopoly,
though each ﬁrm would still prefer to be a monopoly. We allow for both cases.
The parameter α increases with: (1) the degree of product diﬀerentiation, (2) the degree to
which the two goods are complements, and (3) the ability of the two players to collude when they
are a duopoly. If the products are identical, then α ≤ 0.5, with perfect collusion having α = 0.5,
2Bertrand competition having α = 0, and Cournot competition having 0 < α < 0.5. If there is
perfect collusion, then 0.5 ≤ α < 1, depending on the degree of product diﬀerentiation and product
complementarity.
We will assume that x < αy; that is, the single-ﬁrm duopoly proﬁt in a big market is greater
than the monopoly proﬁt in a small market. Thus, the follower would be willing to crowd into a
market despite the leader’s presence if he were sure the market was big (though perhaps not if he
were unsure).
The common prior is that both markets are equally likely to be the big market. Before the
ﬁrst period, the informed player observes the signal θ ∈ Θ = {N,S} which correct identiﬁes the big
market with probability p ≥ 1
2. As the precision, p, approaches 1
2, the signal becomes useless; as
it approaches 1, it becomes perfect. The uninformed player does not observe the informed player’s
signal, but he does know p.
The informed player’s pure strategy is
sI = (tI(θ),aI(θ|tI = t1),aI(θ|tI = tU = t2),aI(θ|tU = t1,tI = t2)) (1)
For given θ, the informed player decides when to enter and whether to follow his signal or not.
If aI = θ, we will say that he “uses the signal”. The uninformed player’s strategy is
sU = (tU,aU|(tU = t1),aU|(tI = tU = t2),aU(aI|tI = t1,tU = t2)) (2)
since he observes no signal. We also will allow mixed-strategies for both players.
Let λ be the uninformed player’s belief as to the probability that the informed player uses
the signal in choosing a market. The strategy proﬁle s = {sU,sI} and λ is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium if EπI(sI,sU) and EπU(sI,sU) are maximized for given λ and s = {sU,sI} and λ is
consistent with sI in terms of Bayesian updating.
One particular value of p is critical for determining the equilibrium, so let us deﬁne:
p ≡
y − xα
(y − x)(α + 1)
(3)
It will turn out that for p < p there is a ﬁrst-mover advantage and for p > p there is a
second-mover advantage.1
We have not yet speciﬁed the timing of moves. In Section 3 we will specify which player goes
ﬁrst exogenously. In Section 4 we will let the players decide endogenously.
3 Exogenous Timing of Entry
We will start by assuming that the sequence of entry is exogenous, a necessary prelude to the
analysis of endogenous entry. For simplicity, we will assume that if the uninformed player moves
1xxx Is there any meaning to the equation for pbar that we could discuss?
3without having observed the informed player’s action, he chooses his market by ﬂipping a fair coin.2
The possible exogenous-timing games are (1) the players move simultaneously, (2) the unin-
formed player must move ﬁrst, and (3) the informed player must move ﬁrst. Proposition 1 says
what happens in the equilibrium of each game.
xxx Let us denote the probability that the uninformed player chooses North when he has no
information by q. Without loss of generality assume that q ≥ .5. q∗
Proposition 1.
1) Consider the perfect bayesian equilibria of the entry game when timing is exogenous.
1) Suppose entry is simultaneous. If q ≤ q∗ = xxx, the informed player uses his signal and the
informed player is indiﬀerent about which market he chooses.
2) Suppose entry is sequential.
2-1) If the uninformed player chooses ﬁrst and q < q∗, he is indiﬀerent about which market he
chooses. The informed player uses the signal if p > p, chooses the opposite of the uninformed
player if p < p, and is indiﬀerent if p = p.
2-2) If the informed player chooses ﬁrst, he uses the signal. The uninformed player imitates him if
if p > p, chooses the opposite of the informed player if p < p, and is indiﬀerent if p = p.
Proof: In the appendix.
Proposition 1 says that when the informed player is the leader, he should use his signal rather
than try to conceal it by randomization. As proved in the Appendix, there is no pooling or semi-
pooling equilibrium. The equilibrium is separating, so the uninformed player can infer the signal θ
perfectly. This is critical in making the players want to delay when θ is relatively precise.
When the informed player is the follower, he has all the less reason to randomize. He knows
he is better informed, so it is natural for him to use the signal, but he must also consider the
competition that arises when both players are in the same market. Hence, the degree of his
information quality aﬀects his decision on whether to use his signal or not. If his information
quality is relatively low, i.e., p < p, he has more reason to worry that the signal is wrong. If the
uninformed player already accidentally selected the location signalled by θ, the informed player
will be reluctant to do the same because of the possibility that both players end up in a small
market, yielding the lowest payoﬀ, αx. In this case, the informed player cares more about avoiding
competition than being in a big market, so he selects the location opposite to what the signal
reveals.
On the other hand, if his information quality is relatively high, i.e., p ∈ (p,1), he has relatively
strong conﬁdence in the correctness of the signal. Even if the uninformed player already chose the
location signalled by θ, it is better to join him there in what is very likely the best market, because
αy > x. Hence, regardless of the uninformed player’s choice of location, the informed player uses
2xxx discuss this assumption. Is it innocuous? I we should drop it. It’s not entirely innocuous. I think if there’s
poor information and the players enter simultaneously, then if the Uninformed player always entered Market North
instead of randomizing the players would have higher payoﬀs than if he randomizes, because they can discoordinate.
4the signal.
Similar reasoning applies to the uninformed player’s strategy. If the informed player’s infor-
mation quality is low, the uninformed player thinks mainly of avoiding competition and diverges
in his choice of market, but if the quality is high, he imitates.


















2 (y − x)
< 0 (4)
As the large market size y increases, the parameter set for which p ∈ (p,1) increases. As
y increases, each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from being a duopolist in the large market increases, whereas the
payoﬀ x from being a small-market monopolist stays the same. Hence, as y increases, the informed
player puts more emphasis on being in the big market and has more reason to follow his signal. The
uninformed player knows this, so he too relies more on the signal– which means that y increases he
becomes more eager to imitate the informed player. On the other hand, as x, the proﬁt when a player
operates as a monopolist in a small market, increases, the parameter set for which p ∈ (p,1) falls.
The loss from being in a small market decreases and each player’s incentive to avoid competition
in one market grows relative to the incentive to be in a big market. As x rises, whichever player is
the follower becomes more likely to diverge from the leader’s choice. Finally, as α increases, each
ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from being a duopolist in the same market increases. Hence, each ﬁrm’s incentive to
avoid being in the same market decreases. Hence, the parameter set of p for which the informed
player sticks to his signal and and the uninformed player wants to imitate the informed player’s
choice increases.
3.1 The Expected Payoﬀs
We wish to make the timing of entry over the two periods endogenous, and this requires setting
out the possible payoﬀs from diﬀerent timings.
The informed player’s expected payoﬀ is one of two expressions, (7) or (8), depending on
whether the uninformed player will have a chance to observe him or not. If the informed player
goes ﬁrst and the uninformed player second, the uninformed player can deduce the signal θ perfectly,





If, however, the uninformed player has no chance to infer the informed player’s signal, he
chooses aU only using his prior, and we have assumed he randomizes 50-50. Hence, the informed






Pr(w|θ)πI (aI,aU = N,w) +
X
w∈{N,S}
Pr(w|θ)πI (aI,aU = S,w)

 (6)
5These two equations cover the four possible combinations of timing. Payoﬀ (7) is for (tU,tI) =
(t2,t1) and payoﬀ (8) is for (tU,tI) = (t1,t2), (t2,t2) and (t1,t1).







Here, note that his posterior belief should be about the true state w and I’s signal, Pr(w,θ), because
I has no chance to observe aI and therefore no chance to infer θ before he makes a decision.


















Table 2: Ex-Ante Expected Payoﬀs Depending on the Period of Entry When the
Signal Is Imprecise: 1


















Table 3: Ex-Ante Expected Payoﬀs Depending on the Period of Entry When the
Signal Is Precise: p < p < 1
We will use Tables 2 and 3 to ﬁnd the equilibrium when ﬁrms choose their times of entry
endogenously.
64 Endogenous Timing of Entry
4.1 First-Mover and Second Mover Advantage
Now we will ﬁnd the conditions under which a player wishes to enter ﬁrst. Denote i’s ex-ante
expected payoﬀ when he enters as the leader, follower, or simultaneously by πL
i , πF
i , and πS
i .








Each player’s best response as follower is to choose a diﬀerent location from the leader, even
though we have assumed that it is better to be a duopolist in the big market than a monopolist
in the small market (α > x/y). As the follower, he can operate as a monopolist in one market by
diverging from the leader. This follower behavior is why equation (10) says that a player’s expected
proﬁts are highest if he is the leader.
If the informed player is the leader, he uses his signal. Since the other player diverges, the
informed player more likely than not ends up as a monopolist in the big market. If he enters as
the follower, however, he should diverge from the uninformed player even if that puts him in the
market he believes is likely to be small. Though if he chooses the signalled market the most likely
outcome is duopoly in the big market, which is better than duopoly in the small market, it might
be duopoly in the small market, the worst possible outcome.
The uninformed player’s reasoning is similar. If he enters as the follower, he should choose a
location opposite to the leader, even though he knows that the leader has chosen what is probably
the big market. He would prefer to be the leader, since then he has probability .5 of ending up as
a monopolist in the big market, compared to a probability of 1 − p, which is less than .5, as the
follower.
In this weak-information case, the payoﬀ from sharing the market is lower than from being




I . If p is low, a player’s weak conﬁdence in
the signal (his or the other player’s) is so low that he puts more emphasis on avoiding competition.
If both players choose locations simultaneously, they might both end up as monopolists, but they
might not. Acting as the follower is better even if it reduces the chance of being in the big market
because it at least prevents the possibility of sharing a small market. The best situation is to be
the leader, the next-best is to be the follower, and the worst case is to enter simultaneously.








Expression (11) says that if information precision is high, then each player does best as the
follower. The informed player knows that if the uninformed player has a chance to observe his
7choice, he will choose the same location. For relatively high p, however, he has strong conﬁdence
in his signal and the payoﬀ from being either a monopolist or a duopolist in the signalled market
is high. Hence, he enters late to prevent his choice from being revealed and imitated. In fact, his
payoﬀ from simultaneous entry is just as high as from being the follower: πS
I = πF
I . If both players
enter simultaneously, the uninformed player still has no chance to observe the informed player’s
choice, and the probability the informed player will end up sharing that market is .5.
As for the uninformed player, if the signal is relatively precise then his ideal is to observe the
informed player’s choice and imitate it. If he cannot, he is indiﬀerent between being the leader
or choosing simultaneously: πS
U = πL
U. In either case, he has no chance to observe the informed
player’s choice and to infer the signal value. Hence, his expected proﬁts are the same in both cases.
Thus, if information precision is relatively low, there is a ﬁrst- mover advantage; but if infor-
mation precision is high, there is a second- mover advantage. If p < p, a player would prefer to go
ﬁrst, but he will delay entry if he thinks the other player will enter ﬁrst, so as to avoid ending up
in the same market. If p > ¯ p, the uninformed player would like to delay entry in order to observe
the informed player’s choice, but if he does delay, the informed player will also delay to prevent
that observation. Both end up delaying because of the conﬂict between two types of second mover
advantage: one from learning and the other from preventing learning.
4.2 The Equilibrium
Using the payoﬀs from Tables 2 and 3 we can characterize the endogenous timing of entry.
Proposition 2. When entry timing is endogenous, then:
1) If information is precise enough, i.e., p > ¯ p , there is a second-mover advantage. In equilibrium,
the informed player enters in the second period, and the uninformed player is indiﬀerent about when
he enters.
2) If information is not precise enough, i.e., p ≤ ¯ p, there is a ﬁrst-mover advantage. There are two
pure-strategy equilibria, one for each of two players entering ﬁrst, and a mixed strategy equilibrium
in which the informed player enters without delay with probability z and the uninformed player
enters without delay with probability w:
(z,w) =

(x − px + py)(α − 1)
(2xα − y − x − 2pxα + 2pyα)
,
(x − px + py)(α − 1)
(2xα − y − x − 2pxα + 2pyα)

(10)
Proof: In the appendix.
The signal’s precision is high if p > p. The informed player delays entry and enters in period
2 to conceal his information. The uninformed player can only use his prior belief of .5, and his
expected payoﬀ is the same whenever and wherever he enters.
The signal’s precision is low if p ≤ p. There are two pure-strategy equilibria, in which the
players enter sequentially into separate markets. Because the information quality is low the players
8hesitate to rely on it and are most concerned with avoiding competition. One player, at least, has
incentive to delay, but his beneﬁt is not from imitating the leader, but from diverging.
If p ≤ p there is also the mixed strategy equilibrium, in which a player has no safe choice. Since
the other player is mixing too, if he enters early he might end up competing in the same market,
but the same thing could happen if he enters late. Entering early does have the advantage that
if the other player enters late, the leader can preempt the signalled market (if he is the informed
player) or have a .5 chance of preempting the signalled market (if he is the uninformed player), and
this must be balanced by a higher probability of ending up competing in the same market. Hence
there is some probability of early entry greater than .5 for each player which leaves each of them
indiﬀerent about when to enter, and that is the equilibrium mixing probability.







(1 − α)(x + y)(y − x)
(2xα − y − x − 2pxα + 2pyα)







(α − 1)(2p − 1)y
(x + y − 2xα + 2pxα − 2pyα)







(1 − α)(2p − 1)x
(2xα − y − x − 2pxα + 2pyα)
2 > 0 (13)
Inequality (13) says that when information precision increases, both players choose early entry
with higher probability. The increase in information precision p makes choosing the signalled market
more attractive. For both players to still be willing to choose the unsignalled market, it must be
that choosing the signalled market results in greater probability of undesirable competition. The
way this probability increases is for both of them to increase their probability of early entry until
the likelihood of competition has risen enough for them to again be indiﬀerent about their times
of entry.
Inequalities (14) and (15) say that the probability of early entry falls with x, the size of the
small market, and rises with y, the size of the big market. When the size of the small market
increases, that increases the beneﬁt from waiting and possibly being the only player to enter in
period 2. As a result, the probability of early entry by the other player does not have to be so high
to keep the player indiﬀerent about his time of entry. The eﬀect of an increase in the size of the
big market is parallel: that increases the beneﬁt from possibly being the only early entrant and
the disadvantage of entering early and making the same choice as the other player must increase
to balance that beneﬁt.
Thus, we have shown that whether a ﬁrst- or a second-mover advantage emerges depends on
whether the preemption eﬀect is dominant, so that the leader does not care about information
leakage, or the information eﬀect is dominant, so the leader’s main concern is to prevent imitation.
When knowledge of which market is best is imperfect, the presence of payoﬀ externalities makes




Usually in information models, we analyze only ex ante eﬃciency— whether equilibrium decisions
maximize the sum of expected payoﬀs given the information available to the players at the start
of the game. Here, however, it is also possible that equilibrium leads to ex post eﬃciency— that
equilibrium decisions maximize the sum of actual payoﬀs, as if decisions were made by a social
planner who had no uncertainty. Here, of course, the uncertainty is over which market is big,
and even the informed player’s information is imperfect. Let us use the word “eﬃcient” to mean
“maximizing the sum of each ﬁrm’s ex-post payoﬀ,” since we have not speciﬁed demand precisely
enough to discuss consumer welfare, which will depend on product variety and the loss from a
market being unserved as well as on equilibrium prices.
In our model a player prefers to be a duopolist in the big market than a monopolist in the
small market, i.e., αy > x. If 2αy > x + y, that is, if α >
x+y
2y , it is eﬃcient for both ﬁrms to be
in the big market, since duopoly proﬁts are large relative to monopoly proﬁts and the diﬀerence
between market sizes is large. Otherwise, eﬃciency requires that the ﬁrms choose diﬀerent markets.
Suppose the informed player’s information is imprecise ( p > p). From Proposition 2, the
pure-strategy equilibria have sequential entry into two diﬀerent markets. If α <
x+y
2y , this is the
eﬃcient outcome. Thus, if competition hurts proﬁts enough or the markets are close enough in
size, imprecise information results in the ﬁrms maximizing industry proﬁts ex post, at least if the
equilibrium is in pure strategies.
Ex ante, neither player knows with certainty which is the big market, so the best a planner
maximizing industry proﬁt can do is to either locate both ﬁrms at the signalled market or to
put them in diﬀerent markets. Locating in the same market is ex ante eﬃcient if and only if
2α(py + (1 − p)x) ≥ x + y, which can be expressed in two ways: 4
α ≥
x + y
2[py + (1 − p)x]
or p ≥
y + x − 2xα
2α(y − x)
(14)
If the planner has only the players’ information about which market is big, expected proﬁts
from co-location will naturally be lower than when he knew perfectly which was big. Thus, the
degree of product diﬀerentiation or duopoly cooperation α has to be bigger than in Proposition 3.
3 xxx Add a proposition saying that the informed player always beneﬁts from greater precision, even if it pushes
him over the critical threshold.
4 When both are in the same market, it is the big market with probability p and the small market with probability
1 − p. Hence, πI = πU = pαy + (1 − p)αx and πI + πU = 2α(py + (1 − p)x). If both are in the separate market,
πI+πU = x+y. Finally, locating both ﬁrms in the same market is ex ante eﬃcient if and only if 2α(py+(1−p)x) ≥ x+y.
10That degree will now depend on the quality of information, p now too, as shown in equation (16).
Proposition 4 characterizes ex-ante eﬃciency using both α and p.
Proposition 4. Ex-ante eﬃciency depends on the ratio of duopoly proﬁt to monopoly proﬁt (α)
and the quality of information (p) as follows.
1) Suppose that duopoly proﬁt is low relative to monopoly proﬁt, so x
y < α <
x+y
2y . Then all pure-
strategy equilibria are eﬃcient.
1-1) If p < p, both pure strategy equilibria are eﬃcient and the mixed strategy equilibrium is not.
(A1 in Figure 1)
1-2) If p < p, all equilibria are eﬃcient. (A2 in Figure 1)
2) Suppose that duopoly proﬁt is high relative to monopoly proﬁt, so
x+y
2y < α. Then improved
information can lead to the ineﬃcient equilibria.
2-1) If p < p, both pure strategy equilibria are eﬃcient but the mixed strategy equilibrium is not.
(A5 in Figure 1)
2-2) If p < p <
y+x−2xα
2α(y−x) , all equilibria are eﬃcient. (A4 in Figure 1)
2-3) If
y+x−2xα
2α(y−x) < p , all equilibria are ineﬃcient. (A3 in Figure 1)
Proof: In the appendix.
Figure 1: Information Quality, Market Size, and Eﬃciency for x = 1 and y = 5
(see end of paper)
Figure 1 illustrates the possible equilibrium regions for the case where the monopoly proﬁts
are x = 1 in the small market and y = 5 in the large market. The values of p lie between .5 and
1, and values of the duopoly/monopoly proﬁt ratio lie between x/y and 1, given our assumption
that the duopoly proﬁt in the big market is greater than the monopoly proﬁt in the small market,
i.e., αy > x. The vertical line represents the boundary condition that α =
x+y
2y and the two sloping
lines represent p = p and p =
y+x−2xα
2α(y−x) .
If we ignore mixed-strategy equilibria, the parameter set of α and p for which the equilibria
are eﬃcient (areas A1, A2, A4 and A5) increases as the information quality declines and duopoly
relative to monopoly proﬁts rise. In area A3, where the duopoly competition is not severe, ex-ante
eﬃciency requires both ﬁrms to locate in the market signaled as big, but the informed player delays
to conceal his greater information precision. The uninformed player enters randomly and they
might end up in separate markets, which is ineﬃcient. In this sense, more accurate information
hurts eﬃciency.
115 Modiﬁcations to the Model
5.1 What if It Is Costly to Delay Entry?
We have assumed that entering in the ﬁrst or the second period have the same direct cost. In fact,
we can imagine the cost being higher in either direction— that entering early is more costly, or that
entering late is more costly. A higher cost of early entry does not change the model in interesting
ways. It reinforces the strong-information equilibrium of delayed entry and it would not modify
the weak-information sequential equilibria unless the direct cost were very high.
What is more interesting is when there is a cost to delay. Such a cost has little impact when
information is weak, but with strong information the pure strategy equilibrium disappears and is
replaced by a mixed strategy equilibrium. In showing this, we will also be able to show when the
uninformed player’s second mover advantage from learning is stronger than the informed player’s
one from preventing learning.
Let us assume that each player has the same exogenous delay cost c of entering in the second
period. Then, Propositions 5 and 6 characterize the equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Suppose that 1
2 < p < ¯ p, and the entry in the second period incurs a cost of c > 0.
1) If c > c∗, the unique equilibrium is (tU,tI) = (t1,t1).
2) If 0 < c < c∗, there exist two pure strategy equilibria (tU,tI) = (t1,t2),(t2,t1) and one mixed
strategy equilibrium (z,w) where z = Pr(tU = t1) and w = Pr(tI = t1).
The values of z,w, and c∗ are z = w =
(px−x−2c−py+xα−pxα+pyα)
(2xα−y−x−2pxα+2pyα) and c∗ =
(y+px−py−xα+pxα−pyα)
2 .
Proof: In the appendix.
Proposition 5 covers the weak-information case. If the delay cost c is low enough, the equilib-
rium is similar to what we found in Proposition 2 for c = 0: two equilibria with sequential entry
and a mixed strategy equilibrium. Only the mixing probability changes, to depend on c, because
now late entry has fallen in attractiveness. If, on the other hand, c is large, both players enter early
in the unique equilibrium. The critical value c∗ equals the cost of losing the chance to observe and




I (an equality apparent from Table 2).
If delay’s direct cost is less than its equilibrium beneﬁt, i.e., c < c∗, the equilibrium in which each
player gives more weight to avoiding competition in the same market can be sustained. Otherwise,
both players enter simultaneously in period 1.
We will soon proceed to the strong-information case, but ﬁrst let us make some observations
on which player gains most from delay. Let dU and dI denote each player’s gain from being the
follower instead of the leader in a game with an exogenous sequence of moves.













, then dU < dI for all p ∈ (¯ p,1). That is, the uninformed player has less beneﬁt
12from delay.











, dU > dI. For
information weak enough, the informed player has the bigger beneﬁt from delay, but for strong
information, the uninformed player does.
Proof: In the appendix.
The value dU is the gain from delay that allows learning (imitating the choice of the informed
player) and the value dI is the gain from delay that preventing learning (preventing the uninformed
player’s imitation). If duopoly competition is severe, so α is small, the dU < dI and the gain
from preventing learning is the greater. This makes sense because strong duopoly competition
reduces the imitator’s beneﬁt to imitation and increases the leader’s cost from it. If competition
is not so severe, the beneﬁt from discovering the signalled market might dominate the negative
payoﬀ externality. The learning beneﬁt does not outweigh the negative payoﬀ externality if the
information is relatively weak (or perhaps we should say “moderately strong,” since we are in
the strong-information case throughout Lemma 2). Learning does outweigh the externality if the
information is strong enough, so in that case it is the uninformed player whose beneﬁt from delay
is the greater.
Lemma 2 is interesting in itself, but it also is useful for characterizing the equilibrium, since
the delay cost cutoﬀs will diﬀer for each player, unlike in the weak-information case, as Proposition
6 says.
Proposition 6. Suppose that αy > x , ¯ p < p < 1 and the delay cost is strictly positive: c > 0 .
1) If c > Max{dU,dI}, the two players both enter in period 1;
2) If Min{dU,dI} < c < Max{dU,dI}, the player with the lowest delay beneﬁt enters in period 1
and the other enters in period 2;
3) If c < Min{dU,dI}, the unique equilibrium is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the players
randomize over their period of entry.
The ﬁrst two cases are simple. The interesting case is the third one where c is positive but
below the delay gains of either player. In this case, the unique equilibrium is a mixed strategies. To
see this, consider the pure strategy combinations. Suppose (tU,tI) = (t1,t1). Then, the uninformed
player has an incentive to deviate to tU = t2 in order to observe the informed player’s choice. If
(tU,tI) = (t2,t1), however, the informed player has an incentive to deviate to tI = t2 to prevent
the uninformed player from observing his choice. If they both enter in the second period, so
(tU,tI) = (t2,t2), the uninformed player has incentive to deviate to tU = t1 because delay does not
allow him to observe the informed player’s move, but it does incur cost c. But if (tU,tI) = (t1,t2),
the informed player might as well deviate to enter in the ﬁrst period, since in this strong-information
case he will follow his signal anyway and so his simultaneous move payoﬀ is the same as his sequential
move payoﬀ except for the delay cost c. Thus, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 6 says that in the strong-information case, the asymmetry between the two kinds
13of second-mover advantage, for learning and for preventing learning, can lead to sequential equilibria
instead of both players’ delaying as we found when c = 0 in Proposition 2. From Lemma 2, the
informed player will be the last to enter for moderate values of c if duopoly competition is intense
or information quality is only moderately strong, because his beneﬁt from preventing competition
will be greater than the uninformed player’s beneﬁt from learning. If duopoly competition is not so
intense and information quality is very strong, then the uninformed player will be the last to enter
because his gain from learning outweighs the loss from duopoly pricing. If the value of c is small
enough, however, both players would be willing to pay it to acquire a second-mover advantage. If
they both do delay, however, they will enter simultaneously, which is no better for the uninformed
player than entering ﬁrst and which is worse taking into account his delay cost c, so he will not delay
unless there is some probability that the informed player will enter early. Entering simultaneously
in period 1, however, is just as good for the informed player as delaying entry to period 2, so the
informed player will not delay unless there is some probability that the uninformed player will enter
late. Hence, a mixed strategy equilibrium results.
The importance of having only a mixed-strategy equilibrium can be overrated, since if c is small
it will take only a small probability of each player entering early to support the equilibrium and
it will look much like the pure-strategy equilibrium when both players delay with certainty. What
is more interesting is the asymmetric second-mover advantages from learning and from preventing
learning: that bigger negative payoﬀ externalities and worse information tend to make the second
mover advantage from preventing learning bigger than that from the learning itself, in contrast to
the conclusion in Yoon (2006).
Recall that in the former section, we checked that when duopoly competition is not severe,
more accurate information can lead to ineﬃcient equilibria because of the informed player’s incentive











note that according to Lemma 2, if a delay of entry is costly, for these parameter sets of α and p,
dU > dI . Then, if dI < c < dU , the informed player should act as the leader and the uninformed
player has a chance to observe his choice and therefore imitate it. Hence, the ex-ante eﬃciency
can be attained. That is, when the duopoly competition is not severe and the informed player’s
information is quite accurate, the moderate but not too high delay cost can resolve the ineﬃciency
and therefore function as a means to increases welfare.
5.2 What if a Monopolist in the Small Market Would Have Higher Proﬁts than
a Duopolist in the Big Market? (αy < x)
So far we have assumed that a player would rather be a duopolist in the big market than a
monopolist in the small market. Then what would happen if we assume instead that αy < x?
In this case, we can easily conjecture that the new assumption reduces the value of being in the
big market as a duopolist, so the ﬁrst mover advantage of preemption now outweighs the second
mover advantage of learning for the uninformed player. The learning motive, in fact, collapses
completely, because obtaining the beneﬁt of learning requires that the follower become a duopolist,
which is inferior to being a monopolist even if the identity of the big market is learned perfectly.
14Therefore, the equilibrium we can expect is same as the one derived when αy < x and the quality
of information is poor. The detailed analysis is analogous to that used in the former sections, so
we skip it here.
Proposition 7 Suppose that αy < x , so a ﬁrm prefers being a monopolist in a small market to




, there exist two pure-strategy equilibria
(tU,tI) = (t2,t1),(t1,t2) and one mixed-strategy equilibrium (z,w) where z = Pr(tU = t1) and
w = Pr(tI = t1). The values (z,w) are identical to those found earlier in equation (15).
The sequential entry in both pure equilibria is based on each player’s incentive to avoid the
competition in the same market. The mixed strategy equilibrium in which players randomize their
entry date survives, but only because the reason for the mixing is not to learn or prevent learning,
but the uncertainty mixing creates over which market to choose to avoid competition. Also, it can
be checked that the pure strategy equilibria are ex-post eﬃcient.5
Proposition 8. Suppose that αy < x, so a player prefers being a monopolist in the small market




, the two pure strategy equilibria
(tU,tI) = (t2,t1),(t1,t2) are ex-post eﬃcient.
Proof: What is eﬃcient depends on α. If α <
x+y
2y , the socially eﬃcient case is the one where each
player operates as separate monopolists. If α >
x+y
2y , it is the one where both players compete in
the big market. Our condition is αy < x where x
y <
x+y
2y . Hence, if αy < x, the socially eﬃcient
case is the one where each player operates as a monopolist in a separate market. Recall that each
player’s best response as the follower is to choose a diﬀerent location from that of the leader. Also,
in both pure equilibria, both players’ timings of actions are sequential always. Therefore, both pure
strategy equilibria are ex-post eﬃcient. 
6 The Literature
The Stackelberg model [Heinrich von Stackelberg [1934]) is an early model of ﬁrst-mover advantage,
a sequential-move quantity game in which the ﬁrst mover, by committing to a large quantity, gains
a proﬁt advantage over the second mover compared to in the simultaneous-move Cournot model.
Articles by Esther Gal-or (1985, 1987), J. Hamilton & S. Slutsky (1990), and Paul Klemperer &
Margaret Meyer (1986) analyze variations of this game. Anderson & Engers (1994), in particular,
5 As an example, consider the Cournot model with linear demand and identical products. In that model, the
duopoly proﬁt per player is less than the half of the monopoly proﬁt, i.e., α <
1
2. Proposition 3 told us that when the
signal of the more-informed player is relatively weak and
x
y < α <
x+y
2y then both pure strategy equilibria are ex-post




2y . Proposition 6 adds that the equilibria are
ex-post eﬃcient even if α <
x
y. Thus, in the linear Cournot model with weak information, ex-post eﬃciency is always
attained in the pure strategy equilibria. In conditions of severe enough competition, unlike our main case where
duopoly was relatively attractive, improved information does not cause a shift an equilibrium with lower industry
proﬁts.
15looks at what happens when the timing of entry is endogenous. Two articles by Eric Van Damme
& S. Hurskens (1999, 2004) look at whether a player would prefer to move ﬁrst or second in various
other games in which both player are already in the market and the choice variables are price
or quantity. With linear quantity setting in a price-setting duopoly game when the timing of
commitment is decided endogenously, they show that in the risk- dominant equilibrium, the high-
cost player will choose to wait and the low-cost player will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg and
price leader. Although the timing of action is decided endogenously, in both models, informational
externalities do not play any role.
Similarly, there is a large literature on the war of attrition and pre-emption games in which
players do not learn about the market as a result of entry. Argenziano & Schmidt-Dengler (2008)
provides a good survey of pre-emption games, and Brunnermeier & Morgan (2004) gives a good
discussion of “clock games”. Bouis, Huisman & Kort (2006) adds uncertainty in the form of changes
in market demand, but this is observed even without entry, and its main interest is in changing the
intervals between entry.
Those articles are about commitment, in a setting without information about the market being
revealed by entry. Gal-Or (1987) shows that a player with superior information on demand may
prefer ex ante to have to move simultaneously rather than ﬁrst, because otherwise if demand is
strong the player will reveal that to its rival by its choice of high output (though George Mailath
[1993] shows that if the well- informed player has the option of moving ﬁrst, it will always take
that option, since to delay reveals that it is trying to hide strong demand). Hans-Theo Normann
(1997, 2002) also looks at what happens when one duopolist is better informed when he makes his
quantity decision. Levin & Peck (2003) looks at a diﬀerent kind of asymmetric information: ﬁrms
diﬀer in their entry cost, and must decide when to enter a natural monopoly in a variant of the
grab-the- dollar game.
In all these models, the players are making decisions about how hard to compete in one market,
not whether to compete at all, and the quality of the informed player’s information is unimportant.
In the present paper, two major concerns will be what happens when the well- informed player turns
out to be wrong after all (since he will not have perfect information), and whether it is eﬃcient to
have entry in two markets rather than one. Also, the decisions will be binary– to enter a market
or not– rather than a continuous quantity or price decision, so we can focus strictly on the order
of moves rather than on distortions arising from entry deterrence tactics.
In other models, players are symmetric but there is uncertainty and the ﬁrst player’s move
creates new information. In Rafael Rob (1991), entry has an informational and payoﬀ externality,
but the players are not asymmetrically informed, and the market is competitive. The timing of
actions is given exogenously, and the focus is on the second mover’s advantage from seeing what
happens to the ﬁrst mover. Rob does not analyze the possible advantage to moving second to
prevent the other player from learning. Patrick Bolton & Chris Harris, Midori Hirokawa & Dan
Sasaki (2001) and Heidrun Hoppe (2000) (see too Heidrun Hoppe & Ulrich Lehmann-Grube (2001))
also look at what happens when the ﬁrst mover’s move reveals something about the state of the
world, as opposed to something about the ﬁrst mover’s information. In the present paper, what
16the second mover gets from observing the ﬁrst mover’s choice is not direct information about the
unknown true state. Market quality is only revealed after both players have moved, so there is
no “Who will bell the cat?” problem. Instead, the players are asymmetrically informed, and one
player’s move reveals something about his information.
Appelbaum and Lim (1985), Spencer and Brander (1992), and Somma (1999) also deal with
the topic of market preemption and delay. The main focus of these papers is the tradeoﬀ between
precommitment and delay’s ﬂexibility in a situation where uncertainty is resolved exogenously over
time. Although precommitment may give market dominance, it can also hurt proﬁts because the
realized true state might not be ﬁt with an early decision. Delay has option value; the choice can
be made later after uncertainty is resolved. Hence, a ﬁrm needs to decide which is more important,
precommitment or ﬂexibility, which can be interpreted as a decision on the allocation of investment
in the various environments. This model is distinct from the ﬂexibility-precommitment literature
because, in this model, the uncertainty is not resolved until both ﬁrms make their choices. Delay
does not provide protection against uncertainty. On the other hand, a follower might learn from
the leader’s choice by being able to infer the leader’s superior information. Our focus, in fact, is
on that informational externality.
Another setting has players asymmetrically informed, but without any payoﬀ externality.
Christopher Chamley and Douglas Gale (1994) and Jianbo Zhang (1997) discuss strategic delay
and the endogenous timing of action when only informational externalities are present and there is
no negative payoﬀ externality from one player choosing the same action as another, though there
is some intrinsic cost to delay. In Chamley and Gale (1994), a player has an incentive to delay
his action to observe other players’ decisions for information updating. Zhang (1997) links this
result to informational cascades. He concludes that the most-informed player is least willing to
wait, because he has the least to learn than other players. He acts as the leader, and other players
mimic him immediately. In these models, although the action timing is endogenous, there are not
payoﬀ externalities from actions. Each player’s main concern is whether the cost of delay is worth
learning other players’ information.
Whether it is best to move ﬁrst or second has received attention outside of economics too. An
example in the marketing is the empirical study by Venkatesh Shankar, Gregory Carpenter and
Lakshman Krishnamurthi (1998); examples from management strategy are the articles by Marvin
Lieberman and David Montgomery (1988, 1998).
In the present paper, the timing of actions is endogenous and the action has both informational
and payoﬀ externalities. Two papers look at this combination.
In Yoon (2006) there is also a less-informed player who delays to learn and a better-informed
player who delays to prevent learning in a war of attrition. Although both players beneﬁt from
being the follower, the gain from learning is greater than from preventing learning, so the leader is
the better-informed player. The conclusion is diﬀerent from the present paper’s because the payoﬀ
structure is diﬀerent. Yoon (2006) models reputation and career concerns rather than entry. Hence,
although the best outcome is to be correct alone (as here), the worst outcome is to be incorrect
17alone, not to be incorrect in company with the other player. In a model of market entry, the worst
outcome is for both players to end up in a small market, having made the same mistake. That
possible payoﬀ is crucial to why the quality of information determines whether the advantage is to
the ﬁrst or the second mover. It also is why the relative magnitude of the gain from learning and
the gain from preventing learning will depend on the business environment in the present model.
Frisell (2003), like the present paper, asks who will enter ﬁrst, a less informed or a better
informed player. He uses a continuous-time model of the war of attrition: who is willing to wait
the longest, when delay means a loss in proﬁts? He ﬁnds, if we may adapt his model to our
paper’s context, that if a ﬁrm’s duopoly proﬁt is higher than its monopoly proﬁt (a case we do not
consider in this paper) or just a little lower, the informed player enters ﬁrst. If duopoly proﬁt is
enough lower, however, the informed player waits longer. What matters is the ratio of duopoly to
monopoly proﬁts, not the degree of information superiority (a degree which will play an important
role in the present paper). In contrast to the model to be laid out here, delay costs are crucial
to the entry decision, but delay can be inﬁnitely long. Here, there will be a deadline for entry.
Players must decide to enter either early, or late. One player cannot simply outwait the other–
if he waits, the result will be simultaneous choices. If both players want to move late, they can
do so, but they will be simultaneous movers. As a result, in our model a player who moves late
must be concerned about ending up in the same market as his rival by accident, even if he has
prevented purposeful imitation. The use of discrete instead of continuous time is merely a matter
of modelling convenience, but the existence of an entry deadline is a substantive diﬀerence between
two papers. A deadline models either the closing of the entry opportunity or the necessity of
choosing which market to enter without having observed the other player’s decision. Closing of
the entry opportunity is important if additional ﬁrms can enter after a certain date, or if demand
or regulatory conditions might become less favorable. Observation of the entry decision becomes
diﬃcult if observable entry must be preceded by lengthy planning and purchase of site-speciﬁc
inputs. Indeﬁnite delay to avoid simultaneous entry then does not incur a stationary delay cost;
it risks a sharp loss. We will ﬁnd, in contrast to Frisell, that even if industry proﬁts suﬀer heavily
when both players are in the same market, the informed player may decide to move ﬁrst if he is not
much better informed. Frisell does not look at industry proﬁts, but we will see that the possibility
of simultaneous entry also has implications for them.
7 Concluding Remarks
Often, a player must make a choice knowing that the choice may be imitated by another player.
This choice might be of a new geographic market, as in our model, or of a new product, which
could be modelled with exactly the same mathematics. Moving ﬁrst may or may not deter entry
into the market by the rival player, but it certainly will reveal information. Hence, in a setting of
endogenous timing of entry, the decision on the timing of entry can be interpreted as the decision on
the ﬂow of his private information. Of course, how is revealed information used by the other player
aﬀects the decision on the timing of entry. If the informed player’s information is not strong, the
attempt by both players to avoid crowding into one market results in the pure strategy equilibrium
18in which they operate as monopolists in separate markets. On the other hand, if the informed
player’s information is relatively valuable, the rival player wants to learn it and imitate his choice.
Hence, an informed player may well choose to delay entry to prevent imitation, which results in an
equilibrium in which no learning is available. This kind of strategic delay by both players increases
the probability that they end up in the same market, so the good information that causes the delay
can actually end up reducing industry proﬁts.
198 Appendix
In the Appendix, ”I” denotes the ”informed player” and ” U” denotes the ”uninformed player”.
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, consider the case where the entry is simultaneous. In this case, it is obvious that U chooses
randomly between N and S because no additional information is observable except his prior belief
that Pr(w = N) = Pr(w = S) = .5. Now, as for the best response of I, without loss of generality,
assume that θ = N. Then,
EπI [aI = N,aU,w] =
X
w∈{N,S}




(x − px + py)(α + 1)
EπI [aI = S,aU,w] =
X
w∈{N,S}




(y + px − py)(α + 1)
where (A1) is the expected payoﬀ when informed player uses his signal and (A2) is the one when
he deviates from it. Then:
EπI [aI = N,aU,w] − EπI [aI = S,aU,w] =
1
2
(y − x)(2p − 1)(α + 1) > 0 (A3)
So, I’s best response is aI = N. This implies that if θ = S, it should be that aI = S. Hence, I’s
best response is to use his signal.
Second, consider the case where the entry is sequential.
1) What if U moves ﬁrst? There are two cases depending on whether I’s signal equals U’s
action or not: θ = aU and θ 6= aU.
Case i: θ = aU. Without loss of generality, assume that θ = aU = N. Then, under the posterior
beliefs Pr(w = N|θ = N) = p and Pr(w = S|θ = N) = 1 − p,
EπI(aI = θ,aU,w) =
X
w∈{N,S}
Pr(w|θ = N)πI (aI = θ,aU,w) = p(αy) + (1 − p)(αx) (A4)
EπI(aI 6= θ,aU,w) =
X
w∈{N,S}
Pr(w|θ = N)πI (aI 6= θ,aU,w) = p(x) + (1 − p)(y) (A5)
where (A4) is I’s expected payoﬀ when he uses his signal and (A5) is the one when he deviates
from his signal. Then, if p R
(xα−y)






20Case ii: θ 6= aU. Without loss of generality, assume that θ = N and aU = S. Then, under the
posterior beliefs Pr(w = N|θ = N) = p and Pr(w = S|θ = N) = 1 − p,
EπI(aI = θ,aU,w) =
X
w∈{N,S}
Pr(w|θ = N)πU (aI = θ,aU,w) = py + (1 − p)x (A6)
EπI(aI 6= θ,aU,w) =
X
w∈{N,S}
Pr(w|θ = N)πU (aI 6= θ,aU,w) = p(αx) + (1 − p)(αy) (A7)
Thus, if p >
(yα−x)
(α+1)(y−x), (A6) > (A7) and if p <
(yα−x)









, (A6) > (A7).
Therefore, I’s best response is as follows: If p >
(xα−y)
(α+1)(x−y) = p, regardless of U’s choice in round
1, I uses his signal. On the other hand, when p < p, if θ = aU, he deviates from his signal and if
θ 6= aU, he uses his signal.
2) What if I moves ﬁrst? This is the harder case, because what U observes is aI, not θ. As θ
is private information, U does not know whether I follows his signal or not in deciding a location.
Here, note that whether θ = N or θ = S, both cases are ex-ante symmetric. Hence, intuitively a
pooling strategy or semi-separating strategy cannot constitute equilibrium. The following analysis
shows that the separating strategy which constitutes equilibrium is the one which implies that I
follows his signal in selecting location.
U must assign some belief λ for that aI = θ. In a pure strategy equilibrium, this belief is
λ ∈ {0,1}. As a ﬁrst step in looking at beliefs, suppose that U’s belief λ does equal zero or one.
Suppose U believes aI = θ, i.e., λ = 1. Without loss of generality, let aI = N. U’s posterior beliefs
are Pr(w = N|θ = N) = p and Pr(w = S|θ = N) = 1 − p , so
EπU (aI = θ,aU,w) =
X
w∈{N,S}
Pr(w|θ = N)πU (aI = aU,w) = p(αy) + (1 − p)(αx) (A8)
EπU (aI 6= θ,aU,w) =
X
w∈{N,S}
Pr(w|θ = N)πU (aU 6= aI,w) = p(x) + (1 − p)(y) (A9)
Next, suppose U believes that aI 6= θ, i.e., λ = 0. Then, U’s posterior beliefs are Pr(w = N|θ =
S) = 1 − p and Pr(w = S|θ = S) = p, so
EπU (aI = θ,aU,w) =
X
w∈{N,S}
Pr(w|θ = S)πU (aI = aU,w) = (1 − p)(αy) + p(αx) (A10)
EπU (aI 6= θ,aU,w) =
X
w∈{N,S}
Pr(w|θ = S)πU (aI 6= aU,w) = (1 − p)(x) + p(y) (A11)
More generally, I might mix, so U’s belief that aI = θ would be λ ∈ [0,1]. Then







Pr(w|θ = N)πU (aI = aU,w)






Pr(w|θ = S)πU (aI = aU,w)









Pr(w|θ = N)πU (aU 6= aI,w)










λ T λ∗ =⇒ EπU (aU = aI,w) T EπU (aU 6= aI,w) (A14)
where λ∗ =
(x−px+py−yα−pxα+pyα)
(y−x)(2p−1)(α+1) . We will state and prove Lemma A.1, included only here in the
Appendix to help prove Proposition 1.
Lemma A.1. Suppose that I chose a location as the leader.




. Then, for all λ ∈ [0,1], U diverges from I’s choice.
b) Suppose that p ∈ (p,1). Then, there exists λ∗ ∈ (0,1) such that if λ ∈ (λ∗,1], U imitates I’s
choice, if λ ∈ [0,λ∗) , U diverges from I’s choice, and if λ = λ∗, U is indiﬀerent between imitating
and diverging.
Proof of Lemma A.1. We start by checking whether λ∗ ∈ (0,1) or not. First, for λ∗, if
p >
yα−x
(y−x)(α+1), λ∗ > 0 and if p <
yα−x










, λ∗ > 0. Also, from λ∗−1 =
(y+px−py−xα+pxα−pyα)
(α+1)(2p−1)(y−x) , if p >
y−αx
(y−x)(α+1), λ∗ > 1 and
if p <
y−αx



















then if λ > λ∗, EπU(aU = aI) > EπU(aU 6= aI), if λ < λ∗ , EπU(aU = aI) < EπU(aU 6= aI), and if
λ = λ∗, EπU(aU = aI) = EπU(aU 6= aI). 
Let us now return to the informed player’s best response, which we can derive using Lemma
A.1. In following, we denote
y−αx
(y−x)(α+1) ≡ ¯ p. Without loss of generality, assume θ = N. Then, I’s
posterior beliefs are Pr(w = N|θ = N) = p and Pr(w = S|θ = N) = 1 − p.




. In this case, U chooses a location diﬀerent from I’s choice for
all λ ∈ [0,1]. Then
EπI (aI = θ,aU,w) =
X
w∈{N,S}
Pr(w|θ = N)πU (aI = θ 6= aU,w) = p(y) + (1 − p)(x) (A15)
EπI (aI 6= θ,aU,w) =
X
w∈{N,S}
Pr(w|θ = N)πU (aI 6= θ = aU,w) = p(x) + (1 − p)(y) (A16)
and
EπI(aI = θ,aU,w) − EπI(aI 6= θ,aU,w) = (y − x)(2p − 1) > 0 (A17)
Thus, I’s best response is to choose the location following his signal, which is consistent to U’s
belief that λ ∈ [0,1].
22Next, let p ∈ (p,1). First, suppose λ > λ∗, so U imitates I. Then:
EπI (aI = θ,aU,w) =
X
w∈{N,S}
Pr(w|θ = N)πU (aI = θ = aU,w) = p(αy) + (1 − p)(αx) (A18)
EπI (aI 6= θ,aU,w) =
X
w∈{N,S}
Pr(w|θ = N)πU (aI = aU 6= θ,w) = p(αx) + (1 − p)(αy) (A19)
and:
EπI(aI = θ,aU,w) − EπI(aI 6= θ,aU,w) = α(y − x)(2p − 1) > 0 (A20)
Hence, I’s best response is to choose a location following the signal, which is consistent to U’s belief
that λ > λ∗.
Second, suppose λ < λ∗, so U diverges from I’s choice. Then, from (A15) - (A16), I chooses a
location following the signal. However, this is inconsistent to U’s belief that λ < λ∗ . Hence, this
case is excluded.
Third, suppose λ = λ∗, so , U is indiﬀerent between imitating and diverging from aI. Suppose σU
is the probability that U imitates I’s choice. Then:







Pr(w|θ = N)πU (aI = aU,w)
















Pr(w|θ = N)πU (aI = aU,w)











= (y − x)(2p − 1)(ασ − σ + 1)
It can be checked that EπI (aI = θ,aU,w) = EπI (aI 6= θ,aU,w) only at σ = 1
1−α. But 1
1−α / ∈
[0,1] for 0 < α < 1. Hence, there exists no σ ∈ [0,1] which yields EπI (aI = θ,aU,w) =
EπI (aI 6= θ,aU,w).
Finally, I’s best response in round 1 is to act so as to reveal his signal perfectly. Since U’s
belief must be correct in equilibrium, it must be λ = 1 and his strategy must be to diverge from
aI if p < p and to imitate aI if p > p, as stated in Proposition 1. 
8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Denote z = Pr(tU = t1) and w = Pr(tI = t1). Also, let Ei(ti = tk) denote i’s expected payoﬀ
when he acts at round k, where i ∈ {I,U} and k ∈ {1,2}.
23(1) Consider the case in which 1
2 < p < p. From Table 2:
EU [tU = t1] = w

−
(p(y − x)(1 − α) − y − xα)
2








EU [tU = t2] = w(y + px − py) + (1 − w)

−


























, xα − 1
2y − 1
2x − pxα + pyα < 0. Hence U’s best response for given w is:
w < w∗ =⇒ z = 1, w = w∗ =⇒ z ∈ [0,1], w > w∗ =⇒ z = 0 (A25)
where w∗ =
(x−px+py)(α−1)
(2xα−y−x−2pxα+2pyα) ∈ (0,1). Returning to Table 2 for I’s payoﬀs:




(x − px + py)(α + 1)

+ (1 − z)(x − px + py) (A26)



























(x − px + py)(1 − α) (A28)
Equation (A28) is identical to (A24). Hence, I’s best response for z is the same as U’s one for w:
z < z∗ =⇒ w = 1, z = z∗ =⇒ w ∈ [0,1], z > z∗ =⇒ w = 0 (A29)
Finally, the intersection of the players’ best response functions (A25) and (A29) yields that (z,w) =
(0,1),(1,0) and (z∗,w∗) – there exist two pure strategy equilibria (tU,tI) = (t2,t1),(t1,t2) and one








(2) Consider the case in which p < p < 1. Table 3 gives U’s payoﬀs as:
EU [tU = t1] = −
(p(y − x)(1 − α) − y − xα)
2
(A30)
EU [tU = t2] = w(α(x − px + py)) + (1 − w)

−





EU [tU = t1] − EU [tU = t2] =
1
2
w(p(−(y − x)(α + 1)) + y − xα) (A32)
Note that for p < p < 1, p(−(y − x)(α + 1)) + y − xα < 0. So U’s best response for w is:
w < 0 =⇒ z = 1,w = 0 =⇒ z ∈ [0,1],w > 0 =⇒ z = 0 (A33)
Next, Table 3 gives I’s payoﬀs as:




(x − px + py)(α + 1)

+ (1 − z)(α(x − px + py)) (A34)
EI [tI = t2] =
1
2
(x − px + py)(α + 1) (A35)
24Thus:









(x − px + py)(α − 1) (A36)
Hence, I’s best response to the uninformed player is:
z > 1 =⇒ w = 1, z = 1 =⇒ w ∈ [0,1], z < 1 =⇒ w = 0 (A37)
The intersections of both players’ best response functions (A33) and (A37) yield that z ∈ [0,1] and
w = 0. 
8.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Case 1: When ¯ p < p < 1: Recall that if ¯ p < p < 1 , in equilibrium, tI = t2 and z ∈ [0,1] where












(x + y + 2xα − 2pxα + 2pyα) (A38)
X
i∈{U,I}
πi (t2,t1) = 2α(x − px + py) (A39)
The computation of (A38) and (A39) yields the following result: A) Suppose that
x+y
2y < α < 1.
Then, if ¯ p < p <
y+x−2xα
2α(y−x) , (A38) > (A39) but if
y+x−2xα
2α(y−x) < p < 1 , (A38) < (A39). B) Suppose
that x
y < α <
x+y
2y . Then, for all p ∈ (¯ p,1) (A38) > (A39). First, assume that
x+y
2y < α < 1.
If p < p <
y+x−2xα
2α(y−x) , the ex-ante eﬃcient case is (tU,tI) = (t1,t1), (t1,t2) or (t2,t2). If U uses
a pure strategy, i.e., z ∈ {0,1}, the outcome is (t1,t2) or (t2,t2), which is ex-ante eﬃcient. If U
uses a mixed strategy, i.e., z ∈ (0,1), then EπU = −
(p(y−x)(1−α)−y−xα)
2 and EπI =
(x−px+py)(α+1)
2 .
So EπU + EπI = 1
2 (x + y + 2xα − 2pxα + 2pyα), which is also ex-ante eﬃcient. Therefore, all
equilibria are ex-ante eﬃcient. On the other hand, if
y+x−2xα
2α(y−x) < p < 1, the ex-ante eﬃcient case
is the one where (tU,tI) = (t2,t1). Since tI = t2 in equilibrium, the equilibrium is not ex-ante
eﬃcient. Second, assume that x
y < α <
x+y




, the ex-ante eﬃcient case
is (tU,tI) = (t1,t1), (t1,t2) or (t2,t2). From the analysis for the case where
x+y
2y < α < 1 and
¯ p < p <
y+x−2xα
2α(y−x) , all equilibria are ex-ante eﬃcient.
Case 2: When 1
2 < p < ¯ p: Recall that if 1
2 < p < p, the equilibrium is (tU,tI) = (t1,t2), (t2,t1)




























, (A40) < (A41). Therefore, for the
ex-ante eﬃciency, the players must enter sequentially. Hence the pure-strategy equilibria (tU,tI) =
(t2,t1),(t1,t2) are ex-ante eﬃcient. As for the mixed strategy equilibrium, the computation yields
that:












x − y − xα − yα + 2xα2
+
 
x2 − 2xyα + y2 − 2x2α + 2x2α2





, the denominator is negative. The numerator is a convex function of p and it attains
the minimum of
(x+y)2(α−1)2




, EπU + EπI < x + y, which means
that the mixed strategy equilibrium is ex-ante ineﬃcient. 
8.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Denote z = Pr(tU = t1) and w = Pr(tI = t1) . Also, denote Ei(ti = tk) as i’s expected payoﬀ
when he acts at round k where i ∈ {U,I} and k ∈ {1,2}. From Table 2 and (A24):















(x − px + py)(1 − α) + c
(A43)
As xα − 1
2y − 1









1 =⇒ z = 1,w = w∗
1 =⇒ z ∈ [0,1],w > w∗




(2xα−y−x−2pxα+2pyα). It can be checked that the numerator is also negative, so w∗ > 0.
Also, w∗
1 − 1 = −
(2c−y−px+py+xα−pxα+pyα)
(2xα−y−x−2pxα+2pyα) which has a negative denominator. Then, if c > c∗, the
numerator is positive and if c < c∗, it is negative where c∗ = 1
2 (y + px − py − xα + pxα − pyα).







, if c > c∗, w∗
1 > 1 and if 0 < c < c∗, w∗
1 < 1. Thus, U’s best response
function is: a) If c > c∗, z = 1. b) If c < c∗, it is (A44). Using an analogous procedure, it can be
checked that I’s best response function is as follows: a) If c > c∗, w = 1. b) If c < c∗,
z < z∗
1 =⇒ w = 1,z = z∗
1 =⇒ w ∈ [0,1],z > z∗
1 =⇒ w = 0 (A45)
Then the equilibrium is: a) If c > c∗, (z,w) = (1,1), b) If c < c∗, (z,w) = (0,1),(1,0) and (z,w)
where z = w =
(px−x−2c−py+xα−pxα+pyα)
(2xα−y−x−2pxα+2pyα) . 
8.5 Proof of Lemma 2


















26So, if p >
(x+y−2xα)
2(y−x)α , dU > dI and if p <
(x+y−2xα)










2(y−x)α − 1 = −
(2yα−y−x)
2(y−x)α . Here, 2yα − y − x is
an increasing function of α. Also, from the condition that αy > x, we know x
y < α. Then,
2yα − y − x|α= x















2(y−x)α > 1 and if α ∈ (α∗,1),
(x+y−2xα)


















, dU > dI. 
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